Rational Verification in Iterated Electric Boolean Games

Electric boolean games are compact representations of games where the players have qualitative objectives described by LTL formulae and have limited resources. We study the complexity of several decision problems related to the analysis of rationality in electric boolean games with LTL objectives. In particular, we report that the problem of deciding whether a profile is a Nash equilibrium in an iterated electric boolean game is no harder than in iterated boolean games without resource bounds. We show that it is a PSPACE-complete problem. As a corollary, we obtain that both rational elimination and rational construction of Nash equilibria by a supervising authority are PSPACE-complete problems.Comment: In Proceedings SR 2016, arXiv:1607.0269

Deciding the Value 1 Problem for #-acyclic Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes

The value 1 problem is a natural decision problem in algorithmic game theory. For partially observable Markov decision processes with reachability objective, this problem is defined as follows: are there strategies that achieve the reachability objective with probability arbitrarily close to 1? This problem was shown undecidable recently. Our contribution is to introduce a class of partially observable Markov decision processes, namely #-acyclic partially observable Markov decision processes, for which the value 1 problem is decidable. Our algorithm is based on the construction of a two-player perfect information game, called the knowledge game, abstracting the behaviour of a #-acyclic partially observable Markov decision process M such that the first player has a winning strategy in the knowledge game if and only if the value of M is 1

Pushing undecidability of the isolation problem for probabilistic automata

This short note aims at proving that the isolation problem is undecidable for probabilistic automata with only one probabilistic transition. This problem is known to be undecidable for general probabilistic automata, without restriction on the number of probabilistic transitions. In this note, we develop a simulation technique that allows to simulate any probabilistic automaton with one having only one probabilistic transition

Deciding the value 1 problem for probabilistic leaktight automata

The value 1 problem is a decision problem for probabilistic automata over finite words: given a probabilistic automaton, are there words accepted with probability arbitrarily close to 1? This problem was proved undecidable recently; to overcome this, several classes of probabilistic automata of different nature were proposed, for which the value 1 problem has been shown decidable. In this paper, we introduce yet another class of probabilistic automata, called leaktight automata, which strictly subsumes all classes of probabilistic automata whose value 1 problem is known to be decidable. We prove that for leaktight automata, the value 1 problem is decidable (in fact, PSPACE-complete) by constructing a saturation algorithm based on the computation of a monoid abstracting the behaviours of the automaton. We rely on algebraic techniques developed by Simon to prove that this abstraction is complete. Furthermore, we adapt this saturation algorithm to decide whether an automaton is leaktight. Finally, we show a reduction allowing to extend our decidability results from finite words to infinite ones, implying that the value 1 problem for probabilistic leaktight parity automata is decidable

IST Austria Technical Report

The theory of graph games is the foundation for modeling and synthesizing reactive processes. In the synthesis of stochastic processes, we use 2-1/2-player games where some transitions of the game graph are controlled by two adversarial players, the System and the Environment, and the other transitions are determined probabilistically. We consider 2-1/2-player games where the objective of the System is the conjunction of a qualitative objective (specified as a parity condition) and a quantitative objective (specified as a mean-payoff condition). We establish that the problem of deciding whether the System can ensure that the probability to satisfy the mean-payoff parity objective is at least a given threshold is in NP ∩ coNP, matching the best known bound in the special case of 2-player games (where all transitions are deterministic) with only parity objectives, or with only mean-payoff objectives. We present an algorithm running in time O(d · n^{2d}·MeanGame) to compute the set of almost-sure winning states from which the objective can be ensured with probability 1, where n is the number of states of the game, d the number of priorities of the parity objective, and MeanGame is the complexity to compute the set of almost-sure winning states in 2-1/2-player mean-payoff games. Our results are useful in the synthesis of stochastic reactive systems with both functional requirement (given as a qualitative objective) and performance requirement (given as a quantitative objective)

Life Is Random, Time Is Not: Markov Decision Processes with Window Objectives

The window mechanism was introduced by Chatterjee et al. [Krishnendu Chatterjee et al., 2015] to strengthen classical game objectives with time bounds. It permits to synthesize system controllers that exhibit acceptable behaviors within a configurable time frame, all along their infinite execution, in contrast to the traditional objectives that only require correctness of behaviors in the limit. The window concept has proved its interest in a variety of two-player zero-sum games, thanks to the ability to reason about such time bounds in system specifications, but also the increased tractability that it usually yields. In this work, we extend the window framework to stochastic environments by considering the fundamental threshold probability problem in Markov decision processes for window objectives. That is, given such an objective, we want to synthesize strategies that guarantee satisfying runs with a given probability. We solve this problem for the usual variants of window objectives, where either the time frame is set as a parameter, or we ask if such a time frame exists. We develop a generic approach for window-based objectives and instantiate it for the classical mean-payoff and parity objectives, already considered in games. Our work paves the way to a wide use of the window mechanism in stochastic models

Le problème de la valeur dans les jeux stochastiques

La théorie des jeux est un outils standard quand il s'agit de l'étude des systèmes réactifs. Ceci est une conséquence de la variété des modèle de jeux tant au niveau de l'interaction des joueurs qu'au niveau de l'information que chaque joueur possède.Dans cette thèse, on étudie le problème de la valeur pour des jeux où les joueurs possèdent une information parfaite, information partiel et aucune information. Dans le cas où les joueurs possèdent une information parfaite sur l'état du jeu,on étudie le problème de la valeur pour des jeux dont les objectifs sont des combinaisons booléennes d'objectifs qualitatifs et quantitatifs.Pour les jeux stochastiques à un joueur, on montre que les valeurs sont calculables en temps polynomiale et on montre que les stratégies optimalespeuvent être implementées avec une mémoire finie.On montre aussi que notre construction pour la conjonction de parité et de la moyenne positivepeut être étendue au cadre des jeux stochastiques à deux joueurs. Dans le cas où les joueurs ont une information partielle,on étudie le problème de la valeur pour la condition d'accessibilité.On montre que le calcul de l'ensemble des états à valeur 1 est un problème indécidable,on introduit une sous classe pour laquelle ce problème est décidable.Le problème de la valeur 1 pour cette sous classe est PSPACE-complet dansle cas de joueur aveugle et dans EXPTIME dans le cas de joueur avec observations partielles.Game theory proved to be very useful in the fieldof verification of open reactive systems. This is due to the widevariety of games' model that differ in the way players interactand the amount of information players have.In this thesis, we study the value problem forgames where players have full knowledge on their current configurationof the game, partial knowledge, and no knowledge.\\In the case where players have perfect information,we study the value problem for objectives that consist in combinationof qualitative and quantitative conditions.In the case of one player stochastic games, we show thatthe values are computable in polynomial time and show thatthe optimal strategies exist and can be implemented with finite memory.We also showed that our construction for parity and positive-average Markov decisionprocesses extends to the case of two-player stochastic games.\\In the case where the players have partial information,we study the value problem for reachability objectives.We show that computing the set of states with value 1 is an undecidableproblem and introduce a decidable subclass for the value 1 problem.This sub class is PSPACE-complete in the case of blind controllersand EXPTIME is the setting of games with partial observations.BORDEAUX1-Bib.electronique (335229901) / SudocSudocFranceF

Games Where You Can Play Optimally with Arena-Independent Finite Memory

For decades, two-player (antagonistic) games on graphs have been a framework of choice for many important problems in theoretical computer science. A notorious one is controller synthesis, which can be rephrased through the game-theoretic metaphor as the quest for a winning strategy of the system in a game against its antagonistic environment. Depending on the specification, optimal strategies might be simple or quite complex, for example having to use (possibly infinite) memory. Hence, research strives to understand which settings allow for simple strategies. In 2005, Gimbert and Zielonka provided a complete characterization of preference relations (a formal framework to model specifications and game objectives) that admit memoryless optimal strategies for both players. In the last fifteen years however, practical applications have driven the community toward games with complex or multiple objectives, where memory -- finite or infinite -- is almost always required. Despite much effort, the exact frontiers of the class of preference relations that admit finite-memory optimal strategies still elude us. In this work, we establish a complete characterization of preference relations that admit optimal strategies using arena-independent finite memory, generalizing the work of Gimbert and Zielonka to the finite-memory case. We also prove an equivalent to their celebrated corollary of great practical interest: if both players have optimal (arena-independent-)finite-memory strategies in all one-player games, then it is also the case in all two-player games. Finally, we pinpoint the boundaries of our results with regard to the literature: our work completely covers the case of arena-independent memory (e.g., multiple parity objectives, lower- and upper-bounded energy objectives), and paves the way to the arena-dependent case (e.g., multiple lower-bounded energy objectives).Comment: Updated title, full version of CONCUR 2020 conference pape